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The third formal check occurs just prior to
the administration of the oath of enlistment.
The enlisting officer explains to. the applicants
the general meaning of Article 83, Uniform
Code of Military Justice (10 U.S.C. §883
(1970)) and the provisions for adverse administrative discharge for fraudulent enlistment.
The applicants are then afforded an opportunity to discuss any withheld or falsified information with the briefer, and they are again
asked if anyone instructed them to withhold or
falsify information. Paragraph 6-7, AR 601270/AFR 33-7/0PNAVINST 1100.4/MCO
P1100.75.
The inauguration of the United States Military Enlistment Processing Command removed
from the control of the recruiting services, the
machinery for testing the mental ability and
the medical condition of applicants for enlistment. Moreover,· the p-roc-edures· used in the'&
AFEES have ·severed the nexus bet~~_en_~ih.~~
d_ishonesf rf£:f!!!t~LJrid the unqualified appli-.
c·ant~, The applicant who raises his/her right
hand, mouths the oath of enlistment, and signs
the enlistment document (Department of De-

fense Form 4), has made his/her own decision.
He/she knows what must be revealed and the
consequences of not revealing the information,
and he/she knows that the enlistment agreement is limited to the language on the signed
documents. If an improper enlistment
nevertheless occurs with the assistance of a recruiter, one might hope that the United States
Court of Military Appeals would reconsider its
opinion in United States v. Russo 6 in the light
of the quality control measures adopted since
that decision. The Court might view public
policy as requiring punishment of both the recruiter and the enlistee for his/her own delicts.

Footnotes
1

United States v. Russo, 1 M.J. 134 (C.M.A. 1975).

2 /d.

at 137.

3

United States v. Little, 1 M.J. 476 (C.M.A. 1976).

4

/rJ,. at 478.

5

Department of the Army General Order Number 7, 26
April 1976, and Department of the Army Regulation
Number 10-52, 28 February 1977.

6

1 M.J. 134 (C.M.A. 1975).

Wagner, Valadez, and Harrison: A Definitive Enlistment Trilogy?
CPT David A. Schlueter, JAGC*
Introduction
Enlistments continue to generate judicial and
administrative interest. Over the past few
years the topic has been raised in a variety of
forums and forms; in some instances the law of
enlistments has been refined and questions answered. But in other areas, the law remains
unsettled, open to continued spec~ulation, and
subject to a variety of interpretations. One
area where enlistment law has received keen
scrutiny is the subject of enlistment contracts
vis a vis the question of personal jurisdiction.
A recent trio of Court of Military Appeals
decisions, United States v. Wagner,! United
States v. Valadez, 2 and United States v. Harrison, 3 sheds some dispositive light on that
issue. This article will examine these three

cases and their potential impact on the law of
enlistments. The first section reviews the three
decisions and the remaining sections deal with
some of the recurring issues raised in enlistment law and addressed by the Court in this
most recent trilogy.

The Decisions
We turn our attention first to the Court's decision in United States v. Wagner, which
served in several respects as t~e keystone for
the Valadez and Harrison decisions. Gregory
Wagner was arrested in Michigan in 1974 for
carrying a concealed weapon in the trunk of his
car. After being arraigned and during a meeting with his mother and appointed attorney,
Wagner learned that the charge might be
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dropped if he were to join the Army. 4 Wagner
subsequently met with Sergeant Olds, a recruiter in Coldwater, Michigan, and took the
initial preenlistment mental examination before
disclosing to the recruiter that he had a charge
pending against him. Sergeant Olds told
Wagner that he would have to suspend processing the enlistment application until "the
court took proper disposition of the case." 5
Several weeks later Sergeant Olds was told by
the prosecuting attorney that an "Order Nolle
Prosequi" had been entered in Wagner's case.
Shortly thereafter Wagner joined the Army.
The Army Court of Military Review viewed
Wagner's enlistment as void but ruled that
jurisdiction existed because of a valid constructive enlistment. 6
The Court of Military Appeals noted that
three separate questions were raised: First,
§}lou,l£1 Wagner's enlistment contract b.eJ!On.§i.tl::
e.!'.~!!,yoJ(\~~~j~~WltlJ;g 0<a purported lack pf
voluntariness?·
:second was there sufficient re.,,_'
crul.termisconduct in the case to void "from the
«--,~~"-~--

"'"~""-""'"'c:i'"-""'.~2-~

'

"'-""'" - _

··

'·.

- .::.

--~c -~,,.~,--.,.,_.,,,,.,__~,_,"""'""' --"-~-·M-"""-''~-dV-

·b~-gi~~Itig'; "th~-en!i~tment"£~r.tti~~tfi"andiilkd'r

<H9. the

9i~qualification by a nomv;~Jy~J~ .§~r,y:
ice regulation constitute "an inherent vice" so.
~!i<LJli~ble Wagner from acquinng military
&taty.s as a matter of enlistment contract law
principles? 7
><_;"' '•

,

•'•"•'-•-•"•••,·'-··•>''.o~--·::C>.~··-·,,<>1\<ht."'-~~J'.JJ',.,,.

,l--~-~~;,1'

Turning first to the issue of "voluntariness,"
the Court relied upon its earlier decision in .
United States v. Lightfoot, 8 and distinguished
Wagner's entry from that in United States v.
Catlow. 9 Here, as in Lightfoot, Wagner had entered the service upon advice of counsel and not
because of intimidation, improper influence, or
the "carrot and stick" method found inCatlow.
Wagner's enlistment was therefore "voluntary.''lO
The second issue caused little concern. The
Court stated:
We find no deliberate violation of re·
cruiting regulations to allow the enlistment
of an ineligible applicant in the present
case, nor any negligenc~ on the part of the
recruiter sufficient to justify voiding the
appellant's original enlistment contract.
Accordingly, there was no recruiter mis~

conduct within the meaning of the United
States v. Russo ... which would require us
on this ground to dismiss the charges
11

The third issue received greater attention.
Wagner had enlisted in violation of a nonwaivable regulatory disqualification which prohibited
individuals from enlisting if criminal or juvenile
charges had been filed by civil authorities or
were still pending. 12 The "precise legal question," according to Judge Fletcher, was
"whether this regulatory disqualification in and
of itself voids the original enlistment contract
for purposes of court-martial jurisdiction."13
Turning to the Supreme Court's decision in In
re Grimley, 14 the Court noted first that the Supreme Court had placed emphasis on the fact
that Grimley had failed to disclose his disqualification to the recruiter prior to his enlistment.
Secondly, the Court was "particularly struck
by the public policy considerations articulated
in 1890, which retain their viability in our mind
with respect to our present day military situation."15 Finally, the Court stated that the regulation in question was constructued for the
be~efit of boththe government and recruit but
aga:lll cited Grimley as support for the proposition that undisclosed violation of the Army recruiting regulations, in and of itself, was not
sufficient to void Wagner's enlistment contract.16
In addition, the Court made, inter alia, the
following points:
a. There is no statutory prohibition against
enlistment by a person, who through counsel, initiates a proposal of military service
as an. alternative to further prosecution for
a civilian criminal offense. 17
b. The recruiting regulation in question,
unlike insanity, idiocy, or infancy, does not
render the contracting party non sui juris
so as to prevent the recruit from changing
his status through enlistment contract. 18
c. Where a mere regulatory disqualification exists, the enlistment contract remains "voidable," absent action by the recruit to void the contact, prior to the com-
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mission of an offense. As such, it is a
proper basis for court-martial jurisdiction.19
Recruiting regulations and recruiter conduct
again appeared as key issues in United States
v. Valadez. 20 Valadez had erringly entered
service in the Navy due to an oversight on the
part of a recruiter who failed to note that Valadez's age and failure to graduate from high
school, cojoined with a low entrance test score,
disqualified him. 21 The Court cited Wagner,
supra, and again noted that although a regulatory violation may provide the recruit with
standing to void his enlistment contract, the
enlistment remains voidable. 22 Here Valadez's
enlistment was not void merely because it violated a particular service regulation. Remaining was the issue of whether the recruiter's
negligence in this case voided the enlistment
contract. No, said the Court, citing its decision
in United States v. Russo. 23 J~!ro.ple negligence:
,.;!Jii:f:n:9frisefoal~ver&uitfcie"ii"twviot~re~i>uEnc:

recruit was eighteen, the recruiter completed
the. necessary paperwork.
Using its decision in United States v.
Brown 28 as a template, the Court did not consider the recruiter's action "unfair":
It is true, however, that the recruiter
was negligent to the extent that he failed
to recognize the apparent age ineligibility
from the appellant's record of juvenile involvement. We hesitate, however, to
equate such apparent inadvertent mistake
by this recruiter with the failure to perform affirmative recruiting practices designed by regulation to prevent such enlistments, so apparent in the Brown case. 29

The Government was, therefore, not estopped
to argue constructive enlistment as a basis for
court-martial jurisdiction over Harrison.

In effect, this recent trio of cases tracks in
many respects with another trio of enlistment
cases-Catlow (voluntariness), Russo (regulafJ>olfc;v.:.,24
tions), and Brown (constructive enlistment).
The
trios differ in one main respect. In this
While ,~!;~Q~\!tt,r~j~~c~et;l. t!!,~JP.!V~! ~£Q.Yrt' s
latest
round of decisions the individual was
application of gon!!!t.p!SRXf!:.~~-It!i§t~t,§jnJ~g!h..,,.,
considered
amenable to court-martial jurisdicW~Yrt:t':lz:,..anq.f,~l~£~z.it approved application of
tion. Several oft-confronted themes run
that doctrine in United States v. Harrison. 25
throughout all these cases and provide further
Harrison had enlisted while sixteen years of
clarification of the present Court's posture on
age, but after reaching seventeen received pay
elistment contracts. In the following sections,
and benefits and indicated to his commanding
we will briefly examine those themes.
officer an intent to perform his assigned
duties-evidence, said the Court, which could
The Enlistment: Voluntary Execution of a
be "construed as an offer on his part, when
Contract
conditionally capable, to enlist or to mislead the
In these three cases, the Court evidenced a
Navy into accepting him as a regular servcontinued
reliance on principles of contract
icemember. " 26
law. 30 One of the core elements in any contract,
of course, is voluntariness. In Wagner, the
The question raised in Harrison was
court emphasized that the recruit was sui juris
whether the recruiter had been negligent in not
and had not been coerced into joining the
discovering that Harrison was a minor and,
Army. 31 Whatever other defects may have
therefore, ineligible. When Harrison could not
existed in Wagner's enlistment, Wagner could
produce a birth certificate the recruiter unsucnot claim that he was incapable of contracting
cessfully checked with the state's bureau of
with the Government. The court did not spevital statistics. As an alternative, the recruiter
cifically delineate what statutory or regulatory
checked with what Harrison claimed to be a
provisions would render the recruit ineligible,
family Bible which only confrrmed Harrison's
but the thrust of the opinion on this point was
lie. 27 A telephonic check with a woman identhat Wagner possessed the legal capacity to
tifying herself as Harrison's grandmother also
contract. 82 However, if the qualifying statute
failed to disclose the sham. Satisfied that the
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or regulation goes to the very power, or ability
to contract (insanity, minority) then the enlistment contract may be invalid even if the
Government can show voluntariness. 33
The fact that the Court is relying on federal
contract law is itself instructive and marks
another instance in an overall shift from the position taken by this Court's precedessors, that
the enlistment is primarily a change in status. 34
In so relying, the Court is swinging into a posture more in line with the civilian judicial
treatment of the enlistment process-at least
on the question of valid formation of an enlistment contract. 35

Recruiting Regulations
The recurring problem of what impact, if
any, recruiting regulation qualifications have
on enlistments was raised both in Wagner and
Valadez. You will recall that the regulatory
disqualification in Wagner involved the "jointhe-Army-or-go-to-jail" disqualification. In
Valadez, the regulatory provisions on mental
proficiency of the recruit were questioned. J:n
both insfances"l]ie"colirfstated that the violatio~- ~£ ~~~crnit'in~i·t-egui;tr~;;~iJ~(f~:fit~~If,'
would cnorvoia"'Hie- eriHstment. The enlistment
w~:~11id i11st~ad be.. y:oT~T,-~.~,~

-'"··-·· · · · · · · __

In so holding, the Court emphasized that it
had never held that an undisclosed violation of
a recruiting regulation would void an enlist37
ment. Wl!~tE;LY~t: th~.£2Yt~ ffi.i:l:Y~P-'~~.2!~,?,
its earlier decision§ seeJ]1,E;)JLto c}~arly predict a
rule inextricably binding the Governml:!nt_~Q
follow _its recruiting regulatiog§_:jail.lJLEL.!q.J2k
low the_rg~ruiti:ng regulatiop!:;_WC)J~1g~J!L~
void e:qli_s._tment. 38 The Court's refinement of
the role of recruiting regulations is welcomed
and the adoption of a rule which treats a regulatorily deficient enlistment as "voidable" falls
more in line with prevailing contract law principles.

-

The disqualified recruit is still able to take
advantage of the regulatory disqualification
prior to, but not after, an offense has been
committed. This last point raises some questions, however. In Wagner, the Court noted

that "absent action by the recruit to void an
enlistment suffering from mere regulatory disqualification, and prior to the commission of the
offense, his enlistment contract remains merely
voidable and is a proper basis for court-martial
jurisdiction. " 39 But in Va.ladez, the Court
opined (when speaking of a regulatory violation) that the enlistment contract remains voidable "until the recruit takes action to void the
contract, prior to his commission of an offense
and action taken by the Government with a
view towards trial. " 40 The latter quote appears
inconsistent with the first. According to the
language in Wagner, the recruit's right to
avoid the enlistment is clearly cut off at the
commission of an offense. The language in Valadez indicates that the commission of the offense and "action by the Government with a
view towards trial" are the cut-off points. The
two events do not necessarily, or normally,
take effect on the same date. Which rule
applies? The cases cited by the court to support
both quoted rules, Morrissey v. Perry 41 and
United States v. Beans, 42 dealt respectively
with situations where the enlistees questioned
their status before and after charges had been
preferred. The Supreme Court's opinion in
Morrissey, supra, and the public policy considerations so heavily relied upon in Wagner
would demand that the recruit may not void the
contract after an offense has been committed. 43
To allow the recruit to void his contract after
the offense but before the Government acts,
would give the recruit an effective "get-outof-jail-free" ticket.
In summary, although the ultimate impact on
the court's position on regulatory deficiencies
in the enlistment contract is yet to be seen,
several conclusions can be drawn. First, regulatory deficiencies in the enlistment will not
necessarily void the enlistment. The Court has
noted:
It is only when the recruiting regulation
also amounts in fact and law to either a
hick of vohmtariness, a statutory incapacity to contract, or a disability embraced
within the enlistment contract principles
intimated by the Supreme Court in Grimley . . . will such a disqualification be found

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _"-r'_ __,__,..._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _.....,.Jl",'iJ:JO.{;?,W!4<h;¥:;·>?o"i
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sufficient to void the enlistment contract
ab initio as a basis for court-martial jurisdiction. 44
Second, the Court, perhaps in a shift of philosophy or analysis, is allowing the Government
a little breathing room in applying the myriad
of technical recruiting regulations, at least in
those cases where the defect is not disclosed.
Third, the recruit's right to invalidate the
enlistment must be timely. Commission of an
offense cuts off his standing and presents the
Government with the option of exercising
court-martial jurisdiction; an option many felt
was abrogated after Russo.

Recruiter Conduct
Another common thread in the three cases is
the action, or inaction, of the recruiters. The
decisions on this point reveal no new or start~
ling revelations but do offer soille refmement of
e~isting principles.
·
The recruiter conduct issue usually arises in
one of two settings: in determining whether an
enlistment is void ab initio under Russo 45
and/or in determining whether the Government
is later estopped from arguing the existence of
a constructive enlistment. 46 Both settings were
present in this latest trio of decisions. In
Wagner, the Court questioned the recruiter's
conduct and found no deliberate violation of recruiting regulations nor any negligence on his
part. In Valadez, the recruiter's simple negligence in not discovering a regulatory disqualification did not void the enlistment. And in
Harrison, the Government was not estopped
from showing a constructive enlistment because the recruiter had not acted unfairly.
In each case, the court further defined and
refined its prior holdings in Catlow, Brown,
and Russo. Several points may be gleaned from
the Court's language. First, where a recruiter's
actions in completing the enlistment process
are in question, misconduct approaching that
found in Russo-intentional violation of Article
84-must normally be present before the enlistment will be voided ab initio on the ground
of recruiter misconduct. Enlistments resulting

from mere recruiter negligence or good faith
actions, according to the court, are not normally considered void because of public policy.
In reaching that decision, the Court stated that
such enlistments are not in the best interests of
the public, the military, or the recruit, but
"delicate" public policy considerations must be
valued:
Moreover, we can hardly classify simple
negligence as a natural wrong in the manner of establishment of an enlistment contract, or conduct on the level of compulsion, solicitation or misrepresentation condemned by implication in G1'imley. Finally,
we believe that the interest of the primary
society in the effective and disciplined
fighting force significantly outweighs any
possible concern on its part with an enlistment of an ineligible recruit inadvertently
caused by simple negligence. 47
·
But, the court also stated that actions
amounting to something less than intentional
misconduct and something more than mere
negligence might nonetheless void an
enlistment:
Moreover, it is conceivable that negligence of a higher degree, e.g. wanton and
willful, which is employed to avoid discovering recruiting disqualifications, coupled
with the existence of such a regulatory disqualification, may be sufficient recruiter
misconduct to justify declaring an enlistment contract so procured void ab initio
for purposes of court-martial jurisdiction. 48
A troubling facet of the recruiter conduct issues is the reliance placed by the Court on "unknowing" actions by the recruiter. In Wagner
especially, the Court spoke in terms of undisclosed regulatory disqualifications. 49 However,
in examining the thrust of the opinion, one can
see that a recruiter might very well be aware of
the deficiency~ but inadvertently misread or
misapply the appropriate regulatory provision,
as in Valadez. Whether the Court assesses the
recruiter's conduct as intentional, grossly negligent or merely negligent will determine
whether the enlistment is valid. Reading

DA Pam 27-50-73

9

Wagner and Valadez together we see that the
mere fact that a deficiency is "disclosed" does
not always render the enlistment void ab initio. More is required. 50
The degree of recruiter, or Government,
misconduct necessary to estop argument of
constructive enlistments is another matter.
Apparently, less is required. In constructive
enlistment situations, the Government is estopped if the actions of the recruiter, or the
Government, are not "fair." What is "fair"? The
court noted the amorphous nature of the term
in Harrison 51 and rather than present detailed
guidelines, the court instead relied on Brown,
supra, to "elicit the boundaries" of the principle of estoppel. 52
Thus~ it seems that if recruiter misconduct,
at the time of enlistment, amounts to an intentional violation of Article 84, UCMJ, the enlistment is void ab initio and the Government
is also estopped from later showing a constructive enlistment. If the enlistment is void ab initio, for some reason other than recruiter misconduct, subsequent "unfair" or "unreasonable"
actions on the part of the Governn mnment
3 may prevent the GGovernment from relying
on the concept of conntructive enlistment.

Constructive Enlistment
In Wagner and Valadez, the Courts of Military Review had rested court-martial jurisdiction on constructive enlistments. Because the
Court of Military Appeals found no evidence
that the original disqualifying features were
ever cured, it rejected application of that concept and instead turned its attention, as discussed in preceding sections, to the question of
whether the enlistments in question were ever
void ab initio.
In Harrison, the Court directly confronted
the issue antated that it was satisfied with the
lawfulness of the doctrine of construcive enlistment. 54 But, the Court added. that its decision should not be "misconstttrued to sanction
the carte blanche determinations by the lower
courts of the constructe enlistments."55
While recognizin the validity of the concept,
the Court nonetheless continued to restrict its

application to situations where the Government
has acted fairly. The conduct of the Government in Harrison was not unreasonable; the
"apparent inadvertent mistake by the recruiter'' did not amount to a failure to perform
affirmative recruiting practices as was the case
in Brown. 56 For the moment, the lower courts
are tasked with determining on a case by case
basis whether the actions or inactions of the recruiter were "unreasonable" or "unfair."
The Harrison case does little to remedy any
of the uneasiness resting on the constructive
enlistment question. The Court, instead of
drawing some definitive guidelines, simply
cited Brown as a pattern for the lower court's
use in those cases in which improper recruiting
practices are involved. The root of the problem
in applying· the concept of constructive enlistment to any given fact pattern is that the "fairness" requirement looks good on paper but
poses numerous practical problems. The question often is reduced to whom the Court believes. If the Court believes that the Government has been consistently legitimate in its
attempt to establish the military status of an accused, then personal jurisdiction will vest. One
means of alleviating the troublesome concept of
fairness which, as the Court recognized, "may
give rise to misuse of the doctrine of constructive enlistment either in favor of the Government or the accused,"5 7 is to create a statutory
constructive enlistment in those cases where
the individual has committed an offense. 58
One point raised in both Wagner and Valadez should be addressed. In rejecting the need
to apply the constructive enlistment concept in
those cases, the court stated that there was no
showing by the Government that the disqualifying conditions had ceased to exist. 59 That
may have been the case in Valadez 60 but not in
Wagner. The Court in Wagner cited Cat low for
the continuing disability ·proposition. But in
Catlow, the Court had stated that Catlow
might have perfected a constructive enlistment
if he had subsequently served voluntarily. 61
Assuming, as the Army Court of Military Review did, that Wagner's enlistment was void,
then a valid constructive enlistment could ripen
because, as the Court itself acknowledged in
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Wagner, there was voluntary service by a
party not suffering from "insanity, idiocy, or
infancy." 62 The disability had dissapated. 63
Public Policy
Although mentioned briefly in Russo, the
court deals at some length in these three decisions with the concept of public policy. There
are repeated references to the Supreme Court's
reliance in Grimley on public policy considerations. With ever so subtle shifts in its reading of the delicate "public policy" or fairness,
the court is free to validate or void any enlistment or constructive enlistment before it. In
this triology it has chosen to validate the enlistments, and, therefore, the military status of
the individuals.
In Wagner, the Court examined the recruiting regulation prohibiting enlistment of someone pending criminal charges and stated:
[P]ublic policy considerations inherent in
the maintenance of a disciplined and effective military to protect society at large dictate against construing such a regulatory
disqualification as inherent in the substance of the contract and requiring automatic voiding of the enlistment contract
without some action of the appellant prior
to the commission of the offense. 64
In Valadez the interest of the primary society in a disciplined fighting force outweighed
any possible concern with an enlistment caused
by inadvertent recruiter actions. 65 And in
Harrison the Government was not estopped
from showing a constructive enlistment because it had acted fairly.
In short, the Court applied, whether intended or not, a balancing test: it considered
the individual's constitutional protections and
the "constitutional interest in the protection of
the primary society by an effective and disciplined fighting force." 6 6

Conclusion
'

As noted at the outset, this most recent
series of enlistment decisions provides some
answers and solutions to enlistment contract

questions. However, the decisions also raise
new issues 67 while at the same time leaving
others yet untouched. 68
Counsel faced with issues similar to those
raised in Wagner, Valadez, and Harrison will
find guidance in those decision and may expect
to raise, among others, the following issues and
questions:
1. Does the disqualification in question go to
the recruit's ability to contract (e.g. insanity,
intoxication, minority)? See Wagner.

2. If so, the contract is probably void. If not,
was the disqualification (statutory or regulatory) disclosed to the recruiter or other Government representative? If not, see Wagner. If
so, counsel should be prepared to litigate
whether subsequent recruiter or Government
actions were intentional (violations of Article
84, UCMJ), wanton, willful, or merely negligent.69 See Valadez.

3. If the disqualification was not disclosed
and no recruiter misconduct was involved, did
the recruit take any action to void his enlistment prior to committing an offense? See
Wagner and Valadez.
4. Was the enlistment voluntarily entered?
5. If contract is void for some reason other
than Government misconduct, was a constructive enlistment formed? If so, does fairness
prevent the Government from asserting it? See
Harrison.
In all situations counsel should be familiar
with all three cases and prepared to argue the
competing interests (i.e. balancing test) and
public policy considerations. Both facets were
continuing threads through and around the
three decisions.
This most recent trio provides further
catalyst for future enlistment decisions and
administrative rulings. 70 It will no doubt continue to stir the varied interpretations and debates that surround the present Court of Military Appeals.

Footnotes
*Instructor, Criminal Law Division, The Judge Advocate
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General's School. Author of The Enlistment Contract: A
Uniform Approach, 77 MIL. L. REV. 1 (1977), and Constructive Enlistments: Alive and Well, THE ARMY
LAWYER, Nov. 1977, at 6.

tion, indictment, trial, or incarceration· in connection
with the charges, or to further proceedings relating to
adjudication as a youthful offender or juvenile delinquent, are granted a release from the charges at any
stage of the court proceedings on the condition that
they will apply for or be accepted for enlistment in the
Regular Army.

1

United States v. Wagner, 5 M.J. 461 (C. M.A. 1978).

2

United States v. Valadez, 5 M.J. 470 (C.M.A. 1978).

3

United States v. Harrison, 5 M.J. 476 (C.M.A 1978).

13

United States v. Wagner, 5 M.J. at 466.

Stipulated testimony at trial indicated that it was
standard procedure in Wagner's county to give individuals, who were charged with offenses not considered
heinous, the option of joining the Army in lieu of prosecution. United States v. Wagner, 5 M.J. at 464, citing
the Army Court of Military Review's decision at 3 M.J.
898, 899 (A.C.M.R. 1977).

14

ln re Grimley, 137 U.S. 147 (1890).

15

United States v. Wagner, 5 M.J. at 467.

16

United States v. Wagner, 5 M.J. at 467. The Court's
holding should not have offered any real surprises. In a
footnote in Lightfoot, the court stated that "[a] failure
to conform with applicable statutes and regulations in
and of itself has been held by the Supreme Court (In re
Grimley, supra), as a matter of public policy, not to
void the original contract on grounds of illegaility."
United States v. Lightfoot, 4 M.J. at 263, n. 3. See also
United States v. Mills, NCM 78 0325 (N.C.M.R. 1978);
United States v. Picou, CM 436169 (A.C.M.R. 1978);
United States v. Feneback, NCM 77 1186 (N.C.M.R.
1977); United States v. Harris, 3 M.J. 627 (N.C.M.R.
1977).

17

United States v. Wagner, 5 M.J. at 668.

4

5

United States v. Wagner, 5 M.J. at 464.

6

United States v. Wagner, 3 M.J. 898, 901 (A.C.M.R.
1977). The Army Court of Military Review found ample
evidence to support the constructive enlistment;
Wagner had enlisted for a three versus two year
(minimum) tour; he pursued an offered advance course
in generator operation; performed all his normal duties
and received benefits; received an accelerated promotion to Private E-2; took advantage of the Army's drug
counseling program; did not protest his status and told
his mother several times during basic training that "he
really liked the Army." 3 M.J. at 901.

7

United States v. Wagner, 5 M.J. at 465.

8

United States v. Lightfoot, 4 M.J. 262 (C.M.A. 1978).
Lightfoot was charged with burglary several months
before his enlistment in the Navy. Through his attorney and with his parents' blessings, he advised the
court of his desire to join the service. He was adjudicated a juvenile and placed on probation. The recruiter,
not involved in these proceedings, was not aware that
the charges had been dismissed contingent on Lightfoot's entry into the service, when he processed his enlistment.

9

United States v. Catlow, 23 C. M.A. 142, 48 C.M.R. 758
(1974).

10

United States v. Wagner, 5 M.J. at 465. See also
United States v. Stengel, NCM 77 2128 (N.C.M.R. 23
June 1978); United States v. Westphal, NCM 77 1259
(N.C.M.R. 23 Nov. 1977), pet. denied 5 M.J. 85
(C.M.A. 1978).

11

12

United States v. Wagner, 5 M.J. at 466.
Army Reg. No. 635-210, Personnel Procurement, Regular Army Enlistment, para. 4-11 (C6, 28 July 1976),
prohibits individuals from enlisting if criminal or
juvenile court charges by civilian authorities are filed
or pending. Footnote 2 to Line 5 of Table 2-6 (C8, 24
June 1971) prohibits enlistment of:
Persons who, as an alternative to further prosecu-

18Jd.
19

United States v. Wagner, 5 M.J. at 469.

20

United States v. Valadez, 5 M.J. 470 (C.M.A. 1978).

21

Marine Corps Order 5310.2J, para 5(a)(l) (17 May
1972); Military Personnel Procurement Manual, Volume 4, Enlisted Procurement, Section 2011, para. 1c.
The regulations provided that a person seventeen years
of age, not a graduate of high school, must attain an
AFQT score of 50. Valadez scored 40. The Court noted
that although a recruiting official, other than the original recruiter was responsible for reviewing the AFQT
scores at the testing station, the negligence would be
chargeable to the government for purposes of courtmartial jurisdiction. United States v. Valadez, 5 M.J.
at 471, n.3.

22

United States v. Valadez, 5 M.J. at 472.

23

United States v. Russo, 23 C.M.A. 511, 50 C.M.R. 650
(1975).

24

United States v. Valadez, 5 M.J. at 474.

25

United States v. Harrison, 5 M.J. 476 (C.M.A. 1978).

26

United States v. Harrison, 5 M.J. 476, 480.

27

As noted by the Navy Court of Military Review in its
decision, the Bible was not a "family Bible," but rather
a Bible Harrison had found in his home and into which
he had simply copied the information from his grandmother's family Bible, except for his correct birthdate.
3 M.J. 1020, 1026, n.7 (N.C.M.R. 1977). Before ac-

~;-,_d·.·····

--------------~--------------~~--,-~------~-----.------------------------~

DA Pam 27-50-73

12
ticle 84, UCMJ, the Court's decision could logically be
read as a harbinger of absolute fidelity to the pertinent
regulations. In Valadez the Court cites Little for the
proposition that "negligence of a higher degree, e.g.,
wanton and willful" joined with a regulatory disqualification might conceivably void an enlistment. Again, in
Little there was no indication that the recruiter was
either wanton or willful in his conduct. However read,
Little does not fit neatly into the Court's new rule. Cf
United States v. Gonzalez, 5 M.J. 770 (A.C.M.R. 1978)
(providing assistance in translating test question
makes enlistment voidable); United States v. Shastid,
NCM 77 2225 (N.C.M.R. 1977) (Recruiter used practice
materials which were similar to actual AFQT test.
Court distinguished Little).

cepting this alternative verification, permitted by regulations, the recruiter checked with recruiting authorities and made further efforts to verify its entries.
5 M.J. at 482.
·
28

United States v. Brown, 23 C.M.A. 162, 48 C.M.R. 778
(1974).

2

9United States v. Harrison, 15 M.J. at 482.
States v. Valadez, 5 M.J. at 473. In Wagner,
the Court indicated at several points the applicability
of contract law principles, especially in reference to
those principles relied upon by the Supreme Court in
United States v. Grimley, 137 U.S. 147 (1890). Recent
federal court decisions have continued to apply contract
law principles in assessh1g the validity of enlistment
contracts. See, e.g., Jackson v. United States, 573 F.2d
1189 (Ct. Cl. 1978); Frentheway v. Bodenhamer, 444 F.
Supp. 275 (D. Wyo. 1977); Febus Nevarez v.
Schlesinger, 440 F. Supp. 741 (D. P.R. 1977); Dubeau
v. Commanding Officer, Naval Reserve, 440 F. Supp.
747 (D. Mass. 1977). See generally, Schlueter, The
Enlistment Contract: A. Uniform Approach, 77 Mil. L.
Rev. 1, 13-24 (1977).

30 United

3 1 United
32

States v. Wagner, 5 M.J. at 465.

39

40 United

41

42

44

United States v. Valadez, 5 M.J. at 472.

45 United

States v. Russo, 23 C.M.A. 511, 50 C.M.R. 650,
I M.J. 184 (1975).

48 United

47

generally Schlueter, The Enlistment Contract: A
Uniform Approach, 77 Mil. L. Rev. 1, 26-28 (1977).

48Jd.

38 See,

e.g., United States v. Little, 1 M.J. 476 (C.M.A.
1976); United States v. Russo, 28 C.M.A. 511, 50
C.M.R. 650, 1 M.J. 134 (1975). In Little the Court,
citing Russo, ruled that a "technical violation" of the
recruiting regulations voided the enlistment. Without
ruling that the recruiter had intentionally violated Ar-

States v. Brown, 23 C.M.A. 162, 48 C.M.R. 778

(1974).

467.

United States v. Valadez, 5 M.J. at 472.

.

The Court may have been thinking of a recent series of
cases in which the timing of the termination of a servicemenber's status was crucial to a finding of personal
jurisdiction. Action by the Government with a view toward trial is, in those cases, the critical point. See,
e.g., United States v. Hudson, 5 M.J. 413 (C.M.A.
1978); United States v. Hutchins, 4 M.J. 190 (C.M.A.
1978); United States v. Smith, 4 M.J. 265 (C.M.A.
1978). See also United States v. Torres, 3 M.J. 659
(A.C.M.R. 1977).

United States v. Valadez, 5 M.J. at 475.

49 United

States v. Wagner, 5 M.J. at 467. The recruiter
knew that charges were pending against Wagner, but
according to the Court, citing the holding of the Army
Court of Military Review, he did not know of the
agreement between the prosecutor, defense counsel,
and Wagner to have the charges dropped. 5 M.J. at

6ln doing so, the Court apparently made no distinction
between waivable and nonwaivable regulatory requirements. In both Wagner and Valadez, the regulations in question were nonwaivable.

37

United States v. Beans, 13 C. M.A. 203, 32 C.M.R. 203

43

sssee note 20 supra.
3

United States v. Perry, 137 U.S. 157 (1890).
(1962).

33 Unanswered

34 See

States v. Wagner, 5 M.J. at 472, 475 (emphasis

added).

United States v. Wagner, 5 M.J. at 466. Here the
Court relied on the language in Grimley, supra, which
indicated that insanity, idiocy, infancy, or other disability which, in its nature, disables a party from
changing his status or entering into new relations,
might render the party incompetent. 137 U.S. at 152.
is the question of the validity of enlistment entered through coercion, but otherwise in conformity with an applicable statutes and regulations.
Under principles of contract law, the enlistment would
probably be considered void. But to avoid establishment of a valid constructive enlistment, the recruit
would have to show the continuing disability of coercion. United States v. Catlow, 23 C.M.A. 142, 48
C.M.R. 7158 (1974); United States v. Wagner, 5 M.J. at

United States v. Wagner, 5 M.J. at 468, 469.

466.
5

°Contributing to the possible confusion here is the
Court's use of a number of terms to describe recruiter
misconduct (e.g., deliberate fraud, knowing, active
misconduct, and misconduct). Reading all three eases
together, it seems that the rule might be stated thusly:
when the recruiter is actually aware of a statutory or
regulatory disqualification, the enlistment will be voi-
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ded if the recruiter intentionally smoothed the path to
the enlistment.
51

United States v. Harrison, 5 M.J. at 481. In addressing
the fairness issue the court cited Reid v. Covert, 354
U.S. 1, 22, 23 (1957) for the proposition that "courtmartial jurisdiction should be restricted to those persons who can 'fairly' said to be actual members or part
of the armed forces." 5 M.J. at 480. Reading Reid,
however, in context leads one to conclude that the Supreme Court was not speaking to the issue of whether
the individual was in the service because of "fair actions" on the part of the Government but rather from a
"fair appraisal" of the facts, the person could be considered in the service. 354 U.S. at 42 (J. Frankfuter,
concurring).

52

United States v. Harrison, at 479, 481.

53

The "fairness" standard is not limited to just recruiters. Theoretically, any Government agent (commanding officer, clerk-typist, platoon sergeant) is bound by
the fairness argument. See United States v. Brown, 23
C.M.A. 162, 48 C.M.R. 778 (1974).

54

United States v. Harrison, 5 M.J. at 480, n.9. The
Navy Court of Military Review's decision in Harrison
is discussed in Steritt, Military Law: In Personam
Jurisdiction: Recruiter Misconduct Sufficient to Preclude a Constructive Enlistment. 'United States v.
Harrison, 3 M.J. 1020 (N.C.M.R. 1977), 30 JAG J. 105
(1978).

55

United States v. Harrison, 5 M.J. at 483.

56

United States v. Harrison, 5 M.J. at 482.

57

United States v. Harrison, 5 M.J. at 481.

58

See Schlueter, supra, 34 at 56 for proposal to amend
the UCMJ. The Joint Service Committee on Military
Justice has under consideration a proposed amendment
to provide for jurisdiction in such cases.

59

United States v. Wagner, 5 M.J. at 465; United States
v. Valadez, 5 M.J. at 473.

60

ln Valadez, the disability went to the question of the
recruit's mental proficiency. Even so, if the Government could have shown that subsequent to the enlistment Valadez had shown a sufficient mental proficiency
to satisfactorily perform his military duties, a valid
constructive enlistment could have been established.
See notes 61, 62 infra.

61

The Court in Catlow assumed that after the civilian
charges were dismissed the recruit could effectuate a
constructive enlistment. However, Catlow made subsequent active and varied protestations against continued service. United States v. Catlow, 23 C.M.A 142,
48 C.M.R. 758 (1974). Wagner, after his charges were
dropped, voluntarily performed his duties. See N. 6,
supra.

62

United States v. Wagner, 5 M.J. at 465. The Court in a

footnote stated that "[t]he cases from this Court relying on Catlow have not held that the violation of a regulation in and of itself voids the enlistment contract,
but instead have relied on a combination of factors, the
primary factor being coercion, in the invalidation of the
enlistment contract." [Emphasis added.] 5 M.J. at 468,
n.14 See also n. 6, supra.
63

A similar result may occur in those cases where the
disqualified recruit completes his first enlistment and
then reenlists. See e.g., United States v. Ivery, 5 M.J.
508 (A.C.M.R. 1978) (Recruit assumed to have illegally
entered the Army, but two years of honorable service
had proved him to be "fully capable of functioning effectively in the military environment"). Cf. United
States v. Long., 5 M.J. 800 (N.C.M.R. 1978) (Recruiter
misconduct in first enlistment carried over to second
enlistment executed only 27 days later).

64

United States v. Wagner, 5 M.J. at 468.

65

United States v. Harrison, 5 M.J. at 475.

66

United States v. Harrison, 5 M.J. at 479. For a discussion of public policy considerations and their application through a balancing test, see Schlueter, The Enlistment Contract: A Uniform Approach, 77 Mil. L.
Rev. 1, 46-49 (1977).

61 See

notes 30 through 43 supra and accompanying text.

68

For example, the burden of proof question was not addressed although it has been considered by the Courts
of Military Review. See, e.g., United States v. Jessie,
5 M.J. 573 (A.C.M.R. 1978); United States v. Loop, 4
M.J. 529 (N.C.M.R. 1977).

69

ln Valadez, the Court stated:
Despite the salutary or beneficial effects which
our decision in United States v. Russo, 1 M.J. 134
(C.M.A. 1975), may have had on recruiting practices, its primary concern was not to punish recruiters for violations of Article 84, Uniform Code
of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 884, by voiding enlistment contracts.
United States v. Valadez, 5 M.J. at 473, n. 7.
Nonetheless, recruiters have been punished. See
United States v. Hightower, 5 M.J. 717 (A.C.M.R.
1978). Recruiter conduct continues to provide spirited
discussion and notwithstanding the Court's foregoing
disclaimer, the Government, in order to establish
jurisdiction is often tasked with showing the innocence
of the recruiter. Consider the language from the de.cision in United States v. Loop, 4 M.J. 529 (N.C.M.R.
1977):
This case illustrates a continuing problem in recruiter misconduct cases. We believe that the recruiter's lack of specific recall, as in this case some
two years after the event, is not unusual and to be
expected. A recruiter sees innumerable applicants
for enlistment as a natural consequence of his job.
To expect recall in detail of conversations which
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take place in routine situations does not comport
with reason or experience. The measure of proof of
a negative fact which can be mustered and the expenditure of effort in money and manpower places
a particularly onerous burden orr the Government
once an issue has been raised by a bald but detailed
assertion of an accused seeking to avoid criminal
penalities. 4 M.J. at 530.
70 1t

is no secret that the Court's decisions in Russo,

Catlow, and Brown generated a great deal of discussion, debate, and attempts to abate what many felt was
a series of onerous and ill-conceived rules. Indeed,
even the Comptroller General has indicated that a military court's determination that it does not have jurisdiction over an individual does not automatically void
the enlistment for purposes of terminating the individual's entitlement to pay and allowances. See 57
Comp. Gen. 132 (1977).

Reductions for Inefficiency: An Overlooked Tool
Major Gregory 0. Varo, Administrative Law Division, OTJAG
As enlisted members move up through the
ranks, most do so with dedication. They know
their abilities; they have confidence in their potential; they are proud of their stripes. Too
often, however, the value of those stripes and
the morale of a unit are diminished because of a
command failure to act swiftly to reduce members who demonstrate their unworthiness for
the grade they hold.
There is a tendency to thin'k of inefficiency in
terms of incompetence on the job-the inept
mechanic, the clerk who cannot type. Inability
to perform the duties of a grade or MOS is only
one form of inefficiency. Besides inability to
perform military duties satisfactorily, other
examples of inefficiency include: failure to
maintain acceptable standards of physical conditioning; financial mismanagement as evidenced by failure to support dependents or to
satisfy long-standing personal indebtedness;
and violations of the Uniform Code of Military
Justice (UCMJ). This latter category is of par- ·
ticular concern because it appears commanders
rarely consider reductions for inefficiency when
they decide that court-martial charges are appropriate. Apparently there is a myth that reduction action at such a time is double jeopardy
or that it would somehow be unfair. Such administrative actions prior to trial are perfectly
legal.
Servicemembers who are suspected of crimi-

nal offenses are subject to nonjudicial punishment (Article 15, UCMJ), court-martial action,
or civilian prosecution. Because reduction for
inefficiency is an administrative procedure
(para 7-64b, AR 600-200, Enlisted Personnel
Management System), it is not to be used in
lieu of Article 15 or for a single act of misconduct where performance of duty is otherwise
satisfactory. However, conduct warranting action under the UCMJ also warrants a commander's immediate consideration of whether
the member's total performance justifies retention in grade. A commander, knowing the pertinent facts of an incident and the prior record
of the individual, may decide that a servicemember should not be retained in his or her
current grade regardless of whether the soldier
in question may later be. proven a criminal
(which involves more stringent rules of evidence and a different standard of proof). If the
commander decides to act under AR 600-200,
he may do so without regard to later action
taken, or not taken, under the UCMJ.
Proper use of reduction authority not only
ensures the ranks are filled with qualified personnel but also instills greater respect for and
pride among those who conscientiously live up
to their responsibilities. Subordinate commanders should be informed that they should
consider administrative reduction in addition to
other possible actions for misconduct.

